Smart offensive coordinators will identify and exploit plus-personnel match ups wherever they find them. A simple way to force man coverage on an elite wide receiver is to align him to the backside (away from the strength of the offensive formation) and run isolation routes (specific routes like a slant or fade in which the ball will be thrown to the targeted receiver). Notice in the image below how much space Green has to work in by aligning outside the numbers away from the formation’s strength. The cornerback must play press coverage to disrupt the route’s timing, as the single-hi safety is located one-yard inside the left hash, making over-the-top help against a vertical route very difficult. In addition, if Green were to catch a quick-game route like a slant or hitch and break a tackle, there is nothing but green grass between the ball and the end zone.

True to his Air Coryell roots, Jackson often attacks down field with 9 routes from Trips/Trey alignments. Against a middle-of-the-field closed coverage like Cover 1 and Cover 3 the free safety must cover half the field to make a play on the ball, effectively taking himself out of the play. Let’s watch Green run a backside 9 route against Seattle.

The Seahawks have checked to a Cover 3 adjustment behind a five-man blitz, forcing the backside cornerback to play MEG (Man Everywhere He Goes) technique. Against an outside release the corner wants to jam with his left hand. pin the receiver to the near sideline, and stay on his inside hip (‘in phase’).

Green creates a free release at the line of scrimmage by using an ‘in-out’ move (fake inside then release outside) that prevents the corner from both jamming and staying over top of the route. Green stacks (pulls in front of the cornerback) by the 40-yard line, allowing Dalton to loft the ball up for an easy pass-catch. Green then uses his open field shakes to cut across the safety’s face to take it in for six.

Lets look at another example of Jackson using the ‘X’ receiver to create a positive personnel match up. In the clip below the Bengals align with a bunch formation to the field (wide-side), forcing the single deep safety to play between the hashes. This alignment effectively prevents the safety from impacting any vertical routes up the sideline as he simply has too much distance to cover.

At the snap the quarterback looks to the let side of the field towards the bunch route concept although he is likely using his eyes to manipulate the safety, forcing him to sit in the middle of the field. Green again uses an ‘in-out’ release to escape the corner’s jam, taking a hard inside step with a shoulder shake to sell an inside-breaking route. The corner takes a slight step inside, all the room a receiver of Green’s caliber needs to cross his face and bend his route towards the sideline. The corner does a decent job staying on his hip, although he looks back for the ball too soon, creating the bit of seperation Green needs to pluck the ball out of the air.

The following is an excerpt from a comprehensive article breaking down Josh Gordon’s fit in the Hue Jackson pass-game posted at the Orange and Brown Report.

The ‘X’ receiver is in often in a unique position to run vertical routes due to the strength of the coverage generally being pushed to the opposite side, leaving the cornerback in one-on-one coverage with no deep help. Big, strong, fast wide receivers like A.J. Green and Josh Gordon feast in this spot.

Green caught a 73-yard touchdown in a week-five victory over the Seattle Seahawks running a ‘Go’ route against man coverage–although the play was called back for holding on the offensive line–on the backside of a ‘Trey’ formation (two wide receivers and one tight end to a single-side of the field).

The Seahawk’s are bringing five-man pressure, playing a 3-deep, 3-under coverage behind the blitz. Because the Bengals’ have three receivers to one side of the field, the defense ‘rolls’ (brings more defenders over) the coverage to the strength of the formation, appearing to force Green’s defender to play MEG (Man Everywhere He Goes) technique. This is a perfect spot for a nine route as Green should consistently beat the defensive back off the line of scrimmage , with the safety’s alignment just inside the left hash making it highly unlikely he can affect the play.

Green creates separation due to his outstanding release at the line of scrimmage. Let’s slow down the film to look at how he gets open and get into some route-running basics.

It all starts with the stance:

• Wide receivers align with the inside foot up to avoid exposing the chest directly to a jam and because many inside-breaking three-step routes like the slant and hitch should stem (break) on the receiver’s third step. By placing the inside foot up, the receiver’s third step will be made with his outside foot, allowing him to break inside without wasted steps (receivers always break with the foot opposite the route’s direction). The back foot should be one to two feet behind the front foot, with the heel slightly off the ground. The knee should be bent forward over the toe, with 70%-80% of the body weight resting on the ball of the foot (where the shoestrings end).
• The shoulders are square and the back is bent to create a straight line from the top of the helmet to the bottom of the back.
• Hands and arms can be relaxed at the side or raised depending on player preference. Against a hard corner, the arms should be at least ¼ up as the receiver will need to hand fight (club/rip, club/swim, etc.)
• Head and chin are turned slightly inside to watch the snap of the ball as receivers often cannot hear the snap count.  

Moving on to the release….

• The hands and feet must work together. This becomes more important when facing press as the receiver will need to hand fight in order to counter the defensive back’s jam.
• At the snap roll off the back foot while exploding off the front. The receiver must not raise the front foot off the ground before exploding,known as ‘false stepping’. False stepping slows the route down and opens the receiver to a jam. Remain low through the explosion like a track and field sprinter in order to generate maximum force.
• From here the footwork takes over. Wide receivers use a variety of footwork to create ‘clean releases’ off the line of scrimmage. Jap steps away from the intended release point are very popular. The receiver must ALWAYS use the foot opposite the break (left foot if breaking right), otherwise he will lose his center of gravity and be unable to make a hard, sharp cut.

Green uses four steps to get hip-to-hip with the cornerback. His first step brings his outside foot parallel to his inside foot, squaring his body to set up a two-way go (can release inside or outside), while his second step is a hard push off his inside foot to cross the defender’s face back outside. The third and fourth steps put Green even with the defender’s hips, forcing him to ‘open the gate’ without executing a route-disrupting jam.

Now let’s speed it up to real time:

Note the slight movement Green’s lead foot makes at the snap. This could be a false step, but is more likely a technique he uses to bring his feet parallel to create the illusion of a two-way go before breaking across the defender’s face.

The following post in an excerpt taking from a comprehensive look at RGIII’s 2012 ROY Campaign posted at The Orange and Brown Report.

Washington’s second long touchdown came off play action, using a two-man Pin concept that integrates a post with an in-breaking Dig route. The H-back will cut block at the line of scrimmage to sell the play action before heading to the flat as a check down. In this example we can clearly see how the offense’s backfield flow causes defenders to use poor eye discipline, resulting in another explosive play.

Against split safeties the offense wants to force the deep left defender to jump the dig route, allowing the post route to hit over his head. The play action is designed to slow the safety’s read of his run/pass key, putting him in conflict to slow his drop to the deep half.

The play action works to perfection, causing the safety to take a step downhill towards his run fit while the post route runs right by him. Take a look from a different angle.

The corner has little chance of making a play here as he is playing with outside leverage against an in-breaking route

The following post is an excerpt taking from a comprehensive breakdown of Robert Griffin III’s 2012 ROY campaign posted at The Orange and Brown Report.

In addition to red zone and short down-and-distance play action concepts, Washington took several vertical shots downfield in positive down/distance situations. The offense hit two long touchdowns off play action in a 38-31 victory over divisional opponent Dallas in week 12.

In 20 personnel with twin receivers to the field (wide side), the offense hit their first big gain of the game through the air using a variant of variation of the Air Raid’s famous Y-Cross concept. The route combination features a deep crossing route (run more like a Dig here) from the X receiver, a seam route designed to clear out the middle of the field by the Y receiver, and a flat route by the H-back. The Z receiver (at the bottom of the screen) runs a quick hitch to act as a hot route will also keeping the cornerback from coming inside to squeeze the throw to the crossing route. Notice the triangle created by the routes

The Cowboys are playing a 3-deep, 3-under coverage shell behind a fire zone blitz. Note the safety at the bottom of the screen at the snap of the ball. Look at both his depth and distance from the hash. Because the safety is playing a SCIF technique due to the blitz, he must carry anything vertical by the #2 receiver. Move your eyes back to the where the deep crosser makes the reception. Without the seam route to clear out the SCIF defender, he would be in great position to make a play on the ball.

Next, move to the WILL (the only linebacker not on the line of scrimmage). Like the safety, he is playing a SCIF technique. His first responsibility is to cushion the seam against any vertical route before breaking on anything short to the flat. The H-back’s flat route pulls him up just enough to allow the crossing route to hit over his head.

This play is a great example of why good coaches do not design routes in a vacuum; they must work together to stretch defenders and clear space.

RGIII’s progression is likely:

1.   Peak the seam
2.   Deep cross/dig
3.   Flat route

The seam route clears out the SCIF defender to the left side of the defense while the flat route pulls up the SCIF defender to the right, allowing RGIII to easily thread the needle for a 60-yard touchdown.

The following post is an excerpt from a comprehensive breakdown of RGIII’s 2012 Rookie of the Year campaign posted at The Orange and Brown Report.

In our final example, we will watch RGIII make a progression-based read running another West Coast classic, the Drive concept, or 2 Jet Flanker Drive (the Steelers often run this play to get the ball to Antonio Brown in space).

The offense comes out in an Empty formation with three receivers to the field and two to the boundary. Against many teams the Empty formation is an automatic pass check, but because RGIII is a dangerous running threat the defense must account for a designed quarterback keep here.

The quarterback’s read will vary based on the coverage. On this particular play Tampa Bay plays their base Tampa 2, with two deep safeties, hard corners playing the flats, and a middle linebacker dropping to protect the open middle of the field.

The progression looks to be out, dig, shallow, although you could make a case for wheel/dig/shallow based on the coverage (it is impossible to say with 100% certainty what the read is without the play call). Because the defense is in a Tampa 2, the progression becomes a simple hi-lo read of the seam defender to the left side of the defense. If the defender gains depth to cushion the dig route, throw the shallow underneath. If the defender jumps the shallow, throw over his head to the dig.

The wheel and digs routes force the seam defender to drop, opening up the shallow route underneath. On the other side of the field, notice how the out route by the #2 receiver pulls the opposite seam defender away from the shallow, creating more room for a catch-and-run.

The following excerpt is taking from a comprehensive post breaking down Browns’ cornerback Justin Gilbert’s 2014 pick-six off Andrew Luck. The entire article can be read at The Orange and Brown Report…

Base pass shells like Cover 1, Cover 2, Cover 3, and Cover 4 are too limited to stop the college and NFL passing game in this age of explosive offense. Creative offensive minds have identified and ruthlessly exploited the weaknesses in the various coverage groups using triangle (and rub concepts against man defense) that vertically and horizontally stretch defenders, creating defined progression and reads for the quarterback. Any offensive coach worth his (or her) salt has several ‘coverage beaters’ in the playbook that take advantage of schematic weaknesses within all of the aforementioned coverage families (think the ‘smash’ concept against Cover 2 or the curl-flat against Cover 3). Most defensive coordinators have integrated ‘pattern matching’ rules into their defenses that require the pass defenders to read the receiver’s release at the line of scrimmage to determine who guards who (like a matchup zone in basketball) to counter ultra-efficient offensive play calling, but even modern-day pattern matching rules can be defeated with creative route design. How do defensive coaches counter these concepts while maintaining tried-and-true base coverages? The answer lies in trap coverages.

Trap coverage has been used up and down the college ranks for a number of years, but only within the last half-decade have we seen widespread matriculation into the NFL coaching ranks. College coaches like TCU Gary Patterson (whose Blue Special and Two Read are likely the most popular versions of trap coverage at the movement) have led the charge in modifying coverage rules within base concepts like Cover 4, both preserving the basic integrity and rules of the defense while changing individual rules and responsibilities. Trap coverages rely on three principles:

• Disguise the coverage pre-snap
• “Show” the quarterback a specific coverage before rotating to something different after the snap 
• Change the ‘usual’ read rules that determine individual responsibility after the receivers release at the snap

Gilbert’s pick-six of Andrew Luck provides a great example of all three principles in action. Without further ado, let’s go to the tape.

Nursing a seven-point lead with ten minutes to go in the 3rd-quarter, the Browns’ defense has Luck facing a second-and-ten from his own 12-yard line. The down and distance make this a likely pass, creating a great opportunity to set a trap. Pettine takes it one step further by running the trap behind a slot blitz from the field defensive back (most teams will slot blitz from the boundary side as the defender has less distance to cover). This is likely by design in order to force Luck’s eyes to the trap side as it is now has one less pass defender and any built-in hot routes will be to that side.

The Colts’ offense is aligned in a Trips right look with the tailback ‘Lo’ (to the left of the quarterback). The defense is showing a single-hi safety in the middle of the field, narrowing the likely pass shell down to Cover 1 or Cover 3. In addition the right and left cornerback are aligned 7-8 yards off the ball with their backs pointed towards the sideline, again signifying Cover 3 or off-man.

Now that the front and coverage have been set, let’s breakdown ‘trap flat’ coverage. The idea is to ‘show’ Luck Cover 1 behind the blitz (across the board man defense with a single deep safety to protect the post) after the snap, when in fact the coverage plays out like Cover 0 (no deep safety help) with a defensive back coming off his man to rob any throws into the strong side flat area.

Gilbert will carry the #1 wide receiver 8-10 yards down the field, and then pass him off to the free safety who will play him in man (known as ‘topping the route’). Once Gilbert passes off the vertical from #1, he will zone turn with his back to the sideline in order to read the quarterback’s eyes and look for any out-breaking routes coming his way. If the quarterback throws the ball to anything outside –breaking (like an out or flat route) Gilbert will be in perfect position to rob the throw.

The right cornerback will play the boundary receiver using a MEG (Man Everywhere he Goes) technique. He is playing off-man coverage here as there is over-the-top safety help. Because the free safety will top anything vertical by the strong side #1, the cornerback is in Cover 0.

The linebackers will use a ‘cut’ technique on the #2 and #3 receivers, playing both from inside leverage and cutting any outside-breaking routes. In a normal Cover 1 this would put both defenders in a poor position to play the pass because their leverage and the receivers’ break to the outside creates natural separation, but the cut technique actually encourages the quarterback to throw the ball into that area because the nine route from #1 should have cleared Gilbert out. Unfortunately for Luck, Gilbert is still there waiting to spring the trap… (cont.)

No fancy production values or script here. I might have misidentified Austin Pasztor as well 

Another rambling, football-esque video breaking down Jamar Taylor’s week-3 interception of Ryan Tannehill.

More of my patented, rambling film studies…